(https://www.lwjstage.com) (https://longwarstg.wpenginepowered.com) (https://cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com) Ukrainian intelligence details new low-cost Russian cruise missile - FDD's Long War Journal Ukrainian intelligence details new low-cost Russian cruise missile - FDD's Long War Journal (analysis-ukrainian-intelligence-details-new-low-cost-russian-cruise-missile.php.html) (https://static.addtoany.com/) (https://use.typekit.net/) (FDD's Long War Journal » Feed) (https://www.longwarjournal.org/feed) (FDD's Long War Journal » Comments Feed) (https://www.longwarjournal.org/comments/feed) (oEmbed (JSON)) (https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-json/oembed/1.0/embed?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.longwarjournal.org%2Farchives%2F2026%2F10%2Fanalysis-ukrainian-intelligence-details-new-low-cost-russian-cruise-missile.php) (oEmbed (XML)) (https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-json/oembed/1.0/embed?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.longwarjournal.org%2Farchives%2F2026%2F10%2Fanalysis-ukrainian-intelligence-details-new-low-cost-russian-cruise-missile.php&format=xml) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/static/optimized/rev-92521e1/www.longwarjournal.org/wp-includes/blocks/navigation/55e2c54229ca46b97303d68eea74b17c.style.min.css) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/static/optimized/rev-92521e1/www.longwarjournal.org/wp-includes/blocks/social-links/55e2c54229ca46b97303d68eea74b17c.style.min.css) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/static/optimized/rev-92521e1/www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/plugins/ttd-topics/public/css/d11aba97205a9f146940a12d55109cb0.ttd-topics-public.css) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/static/optimized/rev-92521e1/use.typekit.net/vlo7ifg.css) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/static/optimized/rev-92521e1/www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/themes/lwj-final-theme (1)/assets/css/711c5f56d2a8fb06ab36ae7bf5e0be04.main.css) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/static/optimized/rev-92521e1/www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/plugins/add-to-any/d47ca5a9d12af147d736c83cf434abe2.addtoany.min.css) (https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-json/) (JSON) (https://www.longwarjournal.org/wp-json/wp/v2/posts/128175) (RSD) (https://www.longwarjournal.org/xmlrpc.php?rsd) (https://www.longwarjournal.org/?p=128175) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/images/optimized/rev-7e52e89/www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/lwj-site-icon-512-300x300.png) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/images/optimized/rev-7e52e89/www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/lwj-site-icon-512-300x300.png) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/images/optimized/rev-7e52e89/www.longwarjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/lwj-site-icon-512-300x300.png) (../../../../cdn-ilelhjd.nitrocdn.com/sIjAVWUHBRvPrlJXCHdtYIrbbBOnQsGe/assets/static/optimized/rev-92521e1/www.longwarjournal.org/externalFontFace/nitro-noimport-b1ea635b70a084221e80ef7de28125f1-stylesheet.css) (https://www.longwarjournal.org) () (https://longwarjournal.org) Home (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/category/analysis) Categories (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/category/analysis) Analysis (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/category/visuals) Visuals (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/category/news) News (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/category/generation-jihad) Podcast (https://www.longwarjournal.org/about) About (https://www.longwarjournal.org/donate) Donate Search () () Search Ukrainian intelligence details new low-cost Russian cruise missile John Hardie (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/category/analysis) Analysis October 23, 2026 () A mock-up of Russia’s Filin missile released on Ukrainian military intelligence’s War & Sanctions portal. Russia has developed a new cruise missile called the Filin, Ukrainian intelligence (https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/warsanctions-hur-rozkryvaie-detali-novoi-rosiiskoi-rakety-filin.html) revealed on Thursday. This adds to Russia’s growing arsenal of low-cost long-range munitions, which are creating challenges for Ukraine’s overstretched air defenses. Designed and manufactured by Moscow-based (https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/components/companies/2510) NPO Molniya , the Filin is ground-launched with a 3.5-meter-long composite fuselage and a 3-meter wingspan, according to the HUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency. The Russians claim the missile can reach speeds of 800 kilometers per hour and has a maximum range of 1,200 kilometers, the HUR said, adding that the Filin “can fly at extremely low altitudes or at altitudes of up to 6 km.” It carries a fairly small warhead of either 50 or 100 kilograms. The missile uses satellite-assisted inertial navigation with a 16-channel Kometa-controlled reception-pattern antenna for resilience against jamming. The Filin’s electronic components are “similar” to those observed in other Russian missiles and drones, the HUR noted. But to reduce costs and facilitate mass production, it features an “increased share of Chinese components (22, compared with 35 American components) and the standardisation of design solutions across different units and circuit boards.” Some of its components are 3D-printed. The missile’s onboard equipment is assembled by the St. Petersburg-based subcontractor PLAZ. That company is also (https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1978) responsible for electronic equipment used in Russia’s Garpiya series of Geran-2 drone variants, and the Filin’s and Garpiya’s “units have similar layouts and markings,” the HUR observed. The missile uses an R500 turbojet engine from Moscow-based Reynolds LLC, also found in other small Russian cruise missiles. () A photo of a Filin missile recovered in Ukraine, (https://t.me/serhii_flash/7824) posted by Ukrainian presidential advisor Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov. In August, the Ukraine-based analyst Rob Lee (https://x.com/RALee85/status/2091161752377659776) reported that “Russia plans to procure more than 1,000” Filin missiles “before the end of the year,” to be operated by units from Russia’s elite Rubicon center and 50th Unmanned Systems Brigade. However, given that the munition apparently has yet to see widespread use in Ukraine, those plans may have shifted to the right. The Filin is part of a trend—in Russia and in other militaries—toward fielding relatively inexpensive, easy-to-produce long-range munitions. These weapons, which increasingly blur the line between drones and cruise missiles, complement more sophisticated, high-cost (“exquisite”) cruise and ballistic missile systems, such as the Kh-101, Kalibr, and Iskander-M, which the Russians have also been modifying. Among these cheaper weapons are the (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/07/russias-banderol-low-cost-cruise-missile-officially-breaks-cover.php) Banderol and (https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2097470728341770494) Dan-T small-sized cruise missiles, which are already being mass-produced. Russia has used these munitions most frequently in southern Ukraine, including to (https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/1188946.html) strike infrastructure involved in grain exports. Offering less range and speed than the Filin but a slightly larger warhead, they can be fired by aircraft such as the Inokhodets drone or from a (https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2107450209425141829) ground-based launcher . Beginning in late 2025, Ukrainian intelligence has also recorded sporadic strikes by a new air-launched cruise missile called the (https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/warsanctions-hur-mo-ukrainy-opryliudniuie-komponenty-ta-budovu-novoi-krylatoi-rakety-rf-izdieliie30) Izdeliye-30 and the (https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/warsanctions-hur-rozkryvaie-detali-novoi-krylatoi-rakety-rf-s71k-kovor.html) S-71 (https://gur.gov.ua/en/content/warsanctions-u-novii-rosiiskii-raketi-monokhrom-vyiavyly-mikrokompiuter-nvidia-jetson-shcho-mozhe-svidchyty-pro-vykorystannia-shi.html) family of air-launched weapons. Russia (https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2097699221054894346) displayed the latter, which are carried by the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter, at an airshow in Egypt in September. There is also the (https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2110855672892215802) UMPB-5R , the jet-powered version of the UMPB-5 glide bomb first seen last year. By far the most numerous threats comes from the Geran family of munitions. The (https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/page-geran-4) Geran-4 is a streamlined, jet-powered version of the propeller-driven Geran-2 one-way attack drone, itself a modification of the Iranian Shahed-136, which Tehran first transferred to Moscow in 2022. The (https://war-sanctions.gur.gov.ua/en/page-geran-5) Geran-5 is faster and more closely resembles a traditional missile. Some Gerans are equipped with (https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2107452004737954046) cameras , mesh radio communications (https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2082149862435422699) equipment , and automatic terminal guidance (https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2074556930190635441) systems , enabling remotely piloted strikes against both fixed and dynamic targets. Newer variants also have a (https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2107072377188221384) terrain-matching system for navigation in jammed environments. This year, Russia’s Geran plant in Alabuga has rapidly shifted production to jet-powered models, outpacing Ukrainian counter-adaptation. Russia is currently (https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/10/21/8058998/) manufacturing around 4,000 Geran-4/5s per month along with 2,000 Geran-2s. The former fly at speeds of around 300 to 600 kilometers per hour, too quick for reliable defeat by Ukraine’s current mass-produced interceptor drones. As a result, Ukraine (https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2103906828652282111) intercepted just 55 percent of Russia’s Geran-4/5s in September, compared to over 90 percent of Geran-2s. The Ukrainians have now (https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/10/18/8058628/) developed a variety of faster interceptor drones, but they are still working on scaling production. Colonel Yurii Cherevashenko, deputy commander of the Ukrainian Air Force, recently (https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/10/06/8056707/) told parliament that these interceptors would be available in sufficient quantities no earlier than the end of November. Some of these interceptors rely on the American satellite internet service Starshield (the military-grade version of Starlink), Ukraine’s access to which was (https://www.wsj.com/world/elon-musks-starlink-speed-cap-has-scrambled-ukraines-defenses-fdfd936e) throttled earlier this month. Although Washington (https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-called-musk-and-asked-him-to-lift-ukraine-starlink-restrictions-5aeebc6e) says that the restriction has now been lifted, Ukraine continued to report (https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-says-starlink-isnt-working-despite-trumps-promise-to-restore-it-c3609d3d) disruptions as of Friday. To defend against jet-powered drones and cruise missiles, Ukraine is leaning heavily on fighter aviation, especially its overworked fleet of F-16s. Ukrainian jets are currently responsible for (https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2105992007130689939) most shootdowns of Geran-4/5s. However, over half of Ukraine’s F-16s are out of action due to a (https://www.wsj.com/opinion/ukraine-f-16-maintenance-delays-russia-sabena-engineering-85ca626a) maintenance bottleneck in Belgium. Kyiv is also (https://x.com/KpsZSU/status/2100144594323210285) running low on air-to-air missiles and 20 mm ammunition for those F-16s that are operational. Moscow is capitalizing on these challenges—along with Kyiv’s shortage of defenses against (https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2026/08/analysis-north-korean-missile-deployment-raises-urgency-of-ukraines-starlink-plea.php) ballistic missiles —to wage a full-court press against Ukraine’s economy and civilian life. In recent months, the Russians have (https://www.ft.com/content/cc96ac01-7929-4954-97a3-7b30e00ef324?syn-25a6b1a6=1) strangled Ukraine’s grain exports, (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjkg7k6z9296o) crippled its steel industry, (https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-hits-passenger-trains-to-break-the-backbone-of-ukraines-economy-morale/) hit hundreds of locomotives, and (https://www.ft.com/content/0ecc81ad-2119-4763-90fb-ba5d399d913d?%5C=&syn-25a6b1a6=1) struck warehouses, shopping malls, (https://www.ft.com/content/7fbecb15-c396-49d2-8cab-1518809a7b2b?syn-25a6b1a6=1) data centers , and telecommunications infrastructure. With winter approaching, Russia has now launched a ferocious (https://www.rferl.org/amp/ukraine-russia-energy-attacks-blueprint-exclusive/33872942.html) campaign to knock out Ukrainian electricity, heat, and water infrastructure. Kyiv is punching back through the air, and its forces are frustrating Russian advances on the ground. Still, this winter will probably be the hardest Ukraine has faced. A positive development for Ukraine is that sooner or later, its defense industry will scale production of faster interceptor drones. However, this addresses only part of the challenge. In the months ahead, Moscow will likely continue to invest in developing counters to Ukrainian adaptation, including by increasing production of small cruise missiles that can outrun the interceptor drones currently coming online. Indeed, in recent weeks, Moscow reportedly has introduced a new, redesigned Geran-5 (https://x.com/JohnH105/status/2113611699689295981) variant that can fly faster, farther, and higher. Ukrainian industry will have to keep pace. But given that fighter aviation will remain a critical layer in Ukraine’s defenses, its Western partners would also need to take the necessary steps to expand F-16 maintenance throughput. John Hardie is the deputy director of FDD’s Russia Program and a contributor to FDD’s Long War Journal. 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