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By Rueben Dass October 20, 2026 (Share on LinkedIn) (https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2F2026%2F10%2Fthe-proliferation-of-illicit-drones-in-southeast-asia%2F&title=The+Proliferation+of+Illicit+Drones+in+Southeast+Asia) (Share on Facebook) (https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2F2026%2F10%2Fthe-proliferation-of-illicit-drones-in-southeast-asia%2F) (Share on Bluesky) (https://bsky.app/intent/compose?text=The+Proliferation+of+Illicit+Drones+in+Southeast+Asia%0Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2F2026%2F10%2Fthe-proliferation-of-illicit-drones-in-southeast-asia%2F) (Share on X) (https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=The+Proliferation+of+Illicit+Drones+in+Southeast+Asia&url=https%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2F2026%2F10%2Fthe-proliferation-of-illicit-drones-in-southeast-asia%2F) (The Proliferation of Illicit Drones in Southeast Asia) (The Proliferation of Illicit Drones in Southeast Asia) A DJI FPV drone photographed at a retail electronics store in Nagoya, Japan, May 22, 2021. Credit: (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DJI_FPV_-_2_(cropped).jpg) Wikimedia Commons/KKPCW (https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions/) Subscribe for ads-free reading Drones have become synonymous with modern-day warfare. Recent conflict theaters in Russia-Ukraine, Myanmar, Sudan, parts of the Sahel, and the Middle East have witnessed the heavy use of drones, and the Russia-Ukraine war in particular has been a crucible of innovation in this regard. Southeast Asia has not been immune to the use of drones, which have been used widely in conflicts such as the 2017 Marawi siege, the Myanmar conflict since 2021, and the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict last year. Beyond their use in conflict, the region has seen a steady increase in the illicit use of drones primarily involving commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) consumer drones (Figure 1). () Figure 1: Illicit drone trends in Southeast Asia over time. (Chart by Rueben Dass) Criminal and terrorist networks have begun adopting this tactic due in part to the media attention given to drones, the accessibility of these systems (particularly COTS drones), and the relatively low barriers to entry with regard to their usage. This article provides a brief overview of illicit drone use in Southeast Asia with the aim of highlighting current trends that may then be beneficial for developing targeted countermeasures in the region. The analysis below is based on 22 illicit drone incidents as reported by the media up to August 2026, excluding the use of drones in conflict zones. Due to the open-source nature of the data, the analysis may be subject to reporting bias and could possibly be an under-representation of the actual phenomenon. Criminal Use Cases The major proportion of illicit drone use in the region – around 86 percent – has been linked to criminal activity. Of these, narcotics-related activity associated with prison incursions and cross-border smuggling has been the highest (Figure 2). In August 2024, a commercial quadcopter drone was used to smuggle narcotics into the (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2024/08/10/drone-drops-drugs-on-rooftop-at-tapah-prison) Tapah prison , the first recorded incident of illicit drone use in Malaysia. The Malaysian Home Ministry noted that there were (https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2024/11/1139884/55-cases-drones-dropping-drugs-prisons-detected-watch) 55 cases of drones being used to smuggle narcotics into prisons that year. Drones have also been used to smuggle other contraband into Malaysian prisons, with two individuals being (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2026/07/17/couple-caught-using-drone-to-smuggle-tobacco-into-melaka-prison) apprehended for attempting to use a DJI Air 2S drone to smuggle tobacco into the Sungai Udang Prison in Malacca in July 2026. A similar case occurred in (https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-police-kelantan-smuggling-tobacco-drones-prison-arrests-3172926) Machang prison in Kelantan in 2025. In June 2025, a drone was (https://www.detik.com/jabar/berita/d-7965219/polisi-buru-pilot-drone-yang-selundupkan-narkoba-ke-lapas-jelekong) used to smuggle drugs into a Class IIA Narcotics Prison in Bandung, West Java. (https://www.detik.com/jabar/berita/d-7965219/polisi-buru-pilot-drone-yang-selundupkan-narkoba-ke-lapas-jelekong) Transactions were made between the buyer (an inmate) and the seller via social media. Similar incidents were recorded in (https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20191216111826-185-457318/teknologi-drone-dipakai-untuk-pasok-narkoba-ke-dalam-penjara) Sragen Prison in 2023 and Nusa Kambangan in 2019, as well as at prisons in the (https://mindanews.com/top-stories/2021/10/shabu-flown-in-by-drone-concealed-in-adobo-meal-intercepted-at-davao-city-jail/) Philippines . () Figure 2: Breakdown of recent illicit drone incidents in Southeast Asia by type of illicit activity. (Chart by Rueben Dass) Aside from prison incursions, narcotics have also featured prominently alongside drones in cross-border smuggling and illicit sales. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has (https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2026/TOCTA_South-East_Asia_2026.pdf) reported that small commercial drones are increasingly being employed for cross-border smuggling of narcotics, particularly along the (https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2026/TOCTA_South-East_Asia_2026.pdf) Malaysia-Thailand , (https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2026/TOCTA_South-East_Asia_2026.pdf) Thailand-Myanmar and (https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2025/Synthetic_Drugs_in_East_and_Southeast_Asia_2025.pdf) Thailand-Laos borders. In June 2020, (https://www.cnb.gov.sg/mediaroom/news/suspected-drug-trafficking-via-unmanned-aircraft-four-arrested/) Singapore and (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/06/25/drugs-by-drone-suspects-wanted-in-singapore) Malaysian authorities dismantled a drug-smuggling syndicate that was using a COTS drone to smuggle narcotics from Malaysia into Singapore. Larger drones have also been linked to cross-border smuggling syndicates. In June 2025, two (https://www.thairath.co.th/news/local/south/2864394) large hexacopter drones were found buried in Sadao district, Songkhla, Thailand. The drones were linked to (https://www.isranews.org/article/south-slide/138874-dronechina.html) three Chinese nationals who were allegedly involved in a narcotics syndicate. In Vietnam, a (https://vietnamnet.vn/cap-vo-chong-xay-trang-trai-o-bac-ninh-dung-flycam-de-buon-ban-ma-tuy-2286931.html) couple was apprehended for using a DJI quadcopter drone to deliver drugs and collect payments from buyers. Apart from delivery mechanisms, narcotics syndicates are also using drones to (https://www.thaipost.net/main/detail/34852) monitor the movements of law enforcement agents and evade detection. Thailand has reported at least three major seizures of drones and drone-related parts over the last two years. A (https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/news/asean/40060211) December 2025 raid on a warehouse in the 2nd Army Area led to the seizure of 2,500 drones that were believed to have been smuggled into the country, while a (https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/news/general/40064330) March 2026 raid on two warehouses in Lat Krabang outside Bangkok led to the seizure of 2,083 drones that were smuggled in and illicitly re-sold on social media platforms. In August 2025, Thai authorities (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3082164/police-seize-drones-from-samut-prakan-warehouse) raided another warehouse in Samut Prakan allegedly linked to a Singaporean company, where numerous drones, signal jamming devices, and a van with signal-disrupting equipment were found. The possibility that some of these networks were linked to cross-border drone trafficking and smuggling syndicates cannot be ruled out. The December 2025 raid was followed by the (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3162219/myanmar-nationals-arrested-with-drones-near-suvarnabhumi) arrest of four Myanmar nationals in a hotel near Suvarnabhumi airport in Bangkok. They were suspected of (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3162219/myanmar-nationals-arrested-with-drones-near-suvarnabhumi) trafficking 10 Chinese drones into Myanmar to be resold to the country’s military junta. The drones were to be (https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40060229) dismantled and transported across the border in parts on commercial passenger flights. The drones seized were large industrial multi-rotor drones. In July 2026, another (https://www.topnews.co.th/news/1637989) Myanmar national who was attempting to smuggle four first-person view (FPV) drones and other drone components across the border to Myanmar was arrested in Mae Sot, in Tak province, on Thailand’s border with Myanmar. The drones were “(https://karennews.org/2026/07/thai-authorities-seize-advanced-drones-intended-for-smuggling-into-myanmar/) advanced systems ” suitable for military applications and had originated in Chiang Mai. The end-user for the drones was not identified. A year earlier, a (https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40052883) one-way attack drone with an explosive warhead believed to have belonged to the Myanmar military was found in the same province. The use of drones by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Myanmar has been well-documented in (https://unidir.org/publication/the-use-of-uncrewed-aerial-systems-by-non-state-armed-groups-exploring-trends-in-myanmar/) several academic studies . The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Centre documented more than (https://acleddata.com/report/war-sky-how-drone-warfare-shaping-conflict-myanmar) 2,100 drone strikes by NSAGs across more than 600 distinct locations in Myanmar, noting it had “significantly reshaped battlefield strategy” by 2024. The junta has increased its (https://acleddata.com/report/war-sky-how-drone-warfare-shaping-conflict-myanmar) reliance on airstrikes since late 2023, closing the gap in drone use with NSAGs. Illicit trafficking and smuggling networks through neighboring countries, as mentioned above, may be playing a role in helping both NSAGs and the military circumvent (https://www.dw.com/en/myanmars-armed-rebel-groups-lose-edge-in-drone-warfare/a-73238199) export controls on dual-use materials by China. U.K.-based Conflict Armament Research found that high-precision European satellite navigation systems that “harden” drones from jamming and spoofing were (https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/75430e34391741d9bb2e7d7b8d1d7c4c) diverted through commercial resale to Myanmar for use by the junta, highlighting another possible entry pathway for these components into the region. Commercial drones have also been used in several cases of suspected espionage. In August 2025, (https://www.kosmo.com.my/2025/08/14/dua-spy-china-intip-mindef-ditahan/) two Chinese nationals were arrested in Kuala Lumpur for trespassing into the Malaysian Ministry of Defense headquarters with a DJI Mavic 3 drone. They were accused of attempting to capture footage from the inside of the building. In the wake of the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict last year, numerous drone reconnaissance flights were (https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2025/08/03/thai-air-force-detects-drone-swarms-over-military-and-government-sites) detected over military installations and government agencies in Thailand, with the government hinting at possible espionage-related activity. Terrorist Use Cases The use of drones by terrorist groups in the region dates back to 2017 during the siege of Marawi in the Philippines by the Islamic State (IS)-linked Maute group. Inexpensive (https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/australian-army-journal-aaj/volume-15-number-1-autumn-edition/battle-marawi-lessons-developing-urban-capabilities) COTS drones were used during the siege primarily for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. The same tactic was also (https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/specialreports/632793/marawi-the-drone-war/story/) employed during the siege by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. No cases of weaponized drones were documented in the region, despite IS’ heavy use of them in Iraq and Syria during the same period. Apart from the Philippines, there have been several cases of Malaysian and Indonesian terrorist cells that have been in possession of or attempted/planned to use drones in terrorist plots. In 2016, Malaysian authorities (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/05/12/factory-worker-jailed-for-terrorismrelated-crimes) uncovered an IS-linked plot to attack the federal police headquarters in Kuala Lumpur with a drone. Apart from online discussions, there was no evidence of drone procurement or actual use. Recent arrests in the country apparently revealed the discovery of drone-related information, simulation games, and applications on electronic devices belonging to some of the terrorism suspects. These included instructions on drone operations. However, there was again no evidence of any operationalization of drones in plots or attacks. In October 2020, a Jemaah Islamiyah cell in Bekasi, West Java, Indonesia was found to be in (https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/weaponized-drones-the-next-terrorist-modus-operandi-in-southeast-asia/) possession of a drone that they allegedly intended to use in an attack. In September 2024, counter-terrorism operations in Indonesia led to the arrest of seven individuals from West Sumatra and the Bangka Belitung Islands who were planning to attack then Pope Francis during his visit to the country. In their possession was a (https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-police-detain-seven-in-a-failed-plot-to-attack-pope-francis) DJI mini drone that could potentially have been used for surveillance or an attack. Apart from drones being used in attacks, Indonesian nationals have also been involved in attempting to smuggle drones to militants in the Middle East. Indonesian court documents viewed by this author revealed a syndicate involved in attempting to transport drones and drone components from Indonesia to militants linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria through Türkiye. The group had procured a Chinese-made Sonicmodell Sea Rescue fixed-wing drone, a Heewing RC F-01 delta-wing drone, an Indonesian-made Rajawali drone, a Diatone Manba MK4 F722 flight controller stack, and a pair of FPV goggles. Some of the items were procured through open websites, social media, and e-commerce sites such as AliExpress. The drone components were packed alongside foodstuff and transported via commercial post to Türkiye to be then sent to HTS militants in Syria. Indonesian authorities also uncovered the use of cryptocurrency in the financial trails. Key Trends and Outlook The cases of illicit drones in the region point to several trends. First, the use of cheap COTS drones for illicit activity remains a key issue of concern. These drones are easily available, have few purchasing restrictions, and are difficult to regulate given their dual-use nature. With drones becoming increasingly cheap and small, and more private companies/vendors engaging in the sale of these items, criminal and terrorist networks are not going to cease attempting to use these types of drones to enhance their illicit operations. Second, within the crime sphere, narcotics have featured prominently with illicit drone use. Drones are not only being used to smuggle the actual drugs but also used for reconnaissance by these networks to evade detection. In the future, drones could also be used to traffic firearms across borders given the close relationship between illicit firearms and narcotics networks in the region. Drones have been used to traffic firearms across the India-Pakistan border in regions like (https://x.com/DGPPunjabPolice/status/2096857805659804034?s=20) Punjab . While there is no present need for illicit actors in the region to engage more sophisticated systems like fiber optic or FPV drones like the Latin American cartels, for example, this possibility cannot be discounted in the future. Third, drone trafficking and smuggling networks possibly linked to conflict actors and NSAGs continue to exploit mainstream businesses through the use of front companies, commercial transport and logistical pipelines, and human mules to traffic drone parts through countries such as Thailand and Indonesia. The modular nature of some drones and the commercial availability of their associated components often facilitate the illicit smuggling and trafficking of these systems. Given the above trends, counter-drone measures should focus on interdicting illicit supply chain networks, logistical and commercial pipelines, and the human nodes linking these networks together. Government agencies must invest sufficient resources in enhancing their individual counter-drone capabilities, both in terms of hardware and trained personnel, and hardening critical infrastructure such as administrative buildings and public infrastructure against attacks by drones. Countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have already incorporated drones in their law enforcement operations and have set up specialized units within their services, which is a positive way forward. This should be complemented with robust legal frameworks that govern and regulate their use, alongside ensuring comprehensive drone forensics capabilities. To conclude, regional governments must be as innovative and effective in their approach to countering drones as their adversaries are in improvising and using them. Already have an account? Log in . You have reached the limit of 2 free articles this month. Get to the bottom of the story (https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions) Subscribe today and join thousands of diplomats, analysts, policy professionals and business readers who rely on The Diplomat for expert Asia-Pacific coverage. Get unlimited access to in-depth analysis you won't find anywhere else, from South China Sea tensions to ASEAN diplomacy to India-Pakistan relations. More than 5,000 articles a year. Unlimited articles and expert analysis Weekly newsletter with exclusive insights 16-year archive of diplomatic coverage Ad-free reading on all devices Support independent journalism (https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions) Subscribe Now (https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions) View Subscription Options Already have an account? Log in . Drones have become synonymous with modern-day warfare. Recent conflict theaters in Russia-Ukraine, Myanmar, Sudan, parts of the Sahel, and the Middle East have witnessed the heavy use of drones, and the Russia-Ukraine war in particular has been a crucible of innovation in this regard. Southeast Asia has not been immune to the use of drones, which have been used widely in conflicts such as the 2017 Marawi siege, the Myanmar conflict since 2021, and the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict last year. Beyond their use in conflict, the region has seen a steady increase in the illicit use of drones primarily involving commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) consumer drones (Figure 1). () Figure 1: Illicit drone trends in Southeast Asia over time. (Chart by Rueben Dass) Criminal and terrorist networks have begun adopting this tactic due in part to the media attention given to drones, the accessibility of these systems (particularly COTS drones), and the relatively low barriers to entry with regard to their usage. This article provides a brief overview of illicit drone use in Southeast Asia with the aim of highlighting current trends that may then be beneficial for developing targeted countermeasures in the region. The analysis below is based on 22 illicit drone incidents as reported by the media up to August 2026, excluding the use of drones in conflict zones. Due to the open-source nature of the data, the analysis may be subject to reporting bias and could possibly be an under-representation of the actual phenomenon. Criminal Use Cases The major proportion of illicit drone use in the region – around 86 percent – has been linked to criminal activity. Of these, narcotics-related activity associated with prison incursions and cross-border smuggling has been the highest (Figure 2). In August 2024, a commercial quadcopter drone was used to smuggle narcotics into the (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2024/08/10/drone-drops-drugs-on-rooftop-at-tapah-prison) Tapah prison , the first recorded incident of illicit drone use in Malaysia. The Malaysian Home Ministry noted that there were (https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2024/11/1139884/55-cases-drones-dropping-drugs-prisons-detected-watch) 55 cases of drones being used to smuggle narcotics into prisons that year. Drones have also been used to smuggle other contraband into Malaysian prisons, with two individuals being (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2026/07/17/couple-caught-using-drone-to-smuggle-tobacco-into-melaka-prison) apprehended for attempting to use a DJI Air 2S drone to smuggle tobacco into the Sungai Udang Prison in Malacca in July 2026. A similar case occurred in (https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/malaysia-police-kelantan-smuggling-tobacco-drones-prison-arrests-3172926) Machang prison in Kelantan in 2025. In June 2025, a drone was (https://www.detik.com/jabar/berita/d-7965219/polisi-buru-pilot-drone-yang-selundupkan-narkoba-ke-lapas-jelekong) used to smuggle drugs into a Class IIA Narcotics Prison in Bandung, West Java. (https://www.detik.com/jabar/berita/d-7965219/polisi-buru-pilot-drone-yang-selundupkan-narkoba-ke-lapas-jelekong) Transactions were made between the buyer (an inmate) and the seller via social media. Similar incidents were recorded in (https://www.cnnindonesia.com/teknologi/20191216111826-185-457318/teknologi-drone-dipakai-untuk-pasok-narkoba-ke-dalam-penjara) Sragen Prison in 2023 and Nusa Kambangan in 2019, as well as at prisons in the (https://mindanews.com/top-stories/2021/10/shabu-flown-in-by-drone-concealed-in-adobo-meal-intercepted-at-davao-city-jail/) Philippines . () Figure 2: Breakdown of recent illicit drone incidents in Southeast Asia by type of illicit activity. (Chart by Rueben Dass) Aside from prison incursions, narcotics have also featured prominently alongside drones in cross-border smuggling and illicit sales. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has (https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2026/TOCTA_South-East_Asia_2026.pdf) reported that small commercial drones are increasingly being employed for cross-border smuggling of narcotics, particularly along the (https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2026/TOCTA_South-East_Asia_2026.pdf) Malaysia-Thailand , (https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2026/TOCTA_South-East_Asia_2026.pdf) Thailand-Myanmar and (https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2025/Synthetic_Drugs_in_East_and_Southeast_Asia_2025.pdf) Thailand-Laos borders. In June 2020, (https://www.cnb.gov.sg/mediaroom/news/suspected-drug-trafficking-via-unmanned-aircraft-four-arrested/) Singapore and (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2020/06/25/drugs-by-drone-suspects-wanted-in-singapore) Malaysian authorities dismantled a drug-smuggling syndicate that was using a COTS drone to smuggle narcotics from Malaysia into Singapore. Larger drones have also been linked to cross-border smuggling syndicates. In June 2025, two (https://www.thairath.co.th/news/local/south/2864394) large hexacopter drones were found buried in Sadao district, Songkhla, Thailand. The drones were linked to (https://www.isranews.org/article/south-slide/138874-dronechina.html) three Chinese nationals who were allegedly involved in a narcotics syndicate. In Vietnam, a (https://vietnamnet.vn/cap-vo-chong-xay-trang-trai-o-bac-ninh-dung-flycam-de-buon-ban-ma-tuy-2286931.html) couple was apprehended for using a DJI quadcopter drone to deliver drugs and collect payments from buyers. Apart from delivery mechanisms, narcotics syndicates are also using drones to (https://www.thaipost.net/main/detail/34852) monitor the movements of law enforcement agents and evade detection. Thailand has reported at least three major seizures of drones and drone-related parts over the last two years. A (https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/news/asean/40060211) December 2025 raid on a warehouse in the 2nd Army Area led to the seizure of 2,500 drones that were believed to have been smuggled into the country, while a (https://www.nationthailand.com/blogs/news/general/40064330) March 2026 raid on two warehouses in Lat Krabang outside Bangkok led to the seizure of 2,083 drones that were smuggled in and illicitly re-sold on social media platforms. In August 2025, Thai authorities (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3082164/police-seize-drones-from-samut-prakan-warehouse) raided another warehouse in Samut Prakan allegedly linked to a Singaporean company, where numerous drones, signal jamming devices, and a van with signal-disrupting equipment were found. The possibility that some of these networks were linked to cross-border drone trafficking and smuggling syndicates cannot be ruled out. The December 2025 raid was followed by the (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3162219/myanmar-nationals-arrested-with-drones-near-suvarnabhumi) arrest of four Myanmar nationals in a hotel near Suvarnabhumi airport in Bangkok. They were suspected of (https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/3162219/myanmar-nationals-arrested-with-drones-near-suvarnabhumi) trafficking 10 Chinese drones into Myanmar to be resold to the country’s military junta. The drones were to be (https://www.nationthailand.com/news/general/40060229) dismantled and transported across the border in parts on commercial passenger flights. The drones seized were large industrial multi-rotor drones. In July 2026, another (https://www.topnews.co.th/news/1637989) Myanmar national who was attempting to smuggle four first-person view (FPV) drones and other drone components across the border to Myanmar was arrested in Mae Sot, in Tak province, on Thailand’s border with Myanmar. The drones were “(https://karennews.org/2026/07/thai-authorities-seize-advanced-drones-intended-for-smuggling-into-myanmar/) advanced systems ” suitable for military applications and had originated in Chiang Mai. The end-user for the drones was not identified. A year earlier, a (https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40052883) one-way attack drone with an explosive warhead believed to have belonged to the Myanmar military was found in the same province. The use of drones by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Myanmar has been well-documented in (https://unidir.org/publication/the-use-of-uncrewed-aerial-systems-by-non-state-armed-groups-exploring-trends-in-myanmar/) several academic studies . The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Centre documented more than (https://acleddata.com/report/war-sky-how-drone-warfare-shaping-conflict-myanmar) 2,100 drone strikes by NSAGs across more than 600 distinct locations in Myanmar, noting it had “significantly reshaped battlefield strategy” by 2024. The junta has increased its (https://acleddata.com/report/war-sky-how-drone-warfare-shaping-conflict-myanmar) reliance on airstrikes since late 2023, closing the gap in drone use with NSAGs. Illicit trafficking and smuggling networks through neighboring countries, as mentioned above, may be playing a role in helping both NSAGs and the military circumvent (https://www.dw.com/en/myanmars-armed-rebel-groups-lose-edge-in-drone-warfare/a-73238199) export controls on dual-use materials by China. U.K.-based Conflict Armament Research found that high-precision European satellite navigation systems that “harden” drones from jamming and spoofing were (https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/75430e34391741d9bb2e7d7b8d1d7c4c) diverted through commercial resale to Myanmar for use by the junta, highlighting another possible entry pathway for these components into the region. Commercial drones have also been used in several cases of suspected espionage. In August 2025, (https://www.kosmo.com.my/2025/08/14/dua-spy-china-intip-mindef-ditahan/) two Chinese nationals were arrested in Kuala Lumpur for trespassing into the Malaysian Ministry of Defense headquarters with a DJI Mavic 3 drone. They were accused of attempting to capture footage from the inside of the building. In the wake of the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict last year, numerous drone reconnaissance flights were (https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/aseanplus-news/2025/08/03/thai-air-force-detects-drone-swarms-over-military-and-government-sites) detected over military installations and government agencies in Thailand, with the government hinting at possible espionage-related activity. Terrorist Use Cases The use of drones by terrorist groups in the region dates back to 2017 during the siege of Marawi in the Philippines by the Islamic State (IS)-linked Maute group. Inexpensive (https://researchcentre.army.gov.au/library/australian-army-journal-aaj/volume-15-number-1-autumn-edition/battle-marawi-lessons-developing-urban-capabilities) COTS drones were used during the siege primarily for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. The same tactic was also (https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/specialreports/632793/marawi-the-drone-war/story/) employed during the siege by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. No cases of weaponized drones were documented in the region, despite IS’ heavy use of them in Iraq and Syria during the same period. Apart from the Philippines, there have been several cases of Malaysian and Indonesian terrorist cells that have been in possession of or attempted/planned to use drones in terrorist plots. In 2016, Malaysian authorities (https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2017/05/12/factory-worker-jailed-for-terrorismrelated-crimes) uncovered an IS-linked plot to attack the federal police headquarters in Kuala Lumpur with a drone. Apart from online discussions, there was no evidence of drone procurement or actual use. Recent arrests in the country apparently revealed the discovery of drone-related information, simulation games, and applications on electronic devices belonging to some of the terrorism suspects. These included instructions on drone operations. However, there was again no evidence of any operationalization of drones in plots or attacks. In October 2020, a Jemaah Islamiyah cell in Bekasi, West Java, Indonesia was found to be in (https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/weaponized-drones-the-next-terrorist-modus-operandi-in-southeast-asia/) possession of a drone that they allegedly intended to use in an attack. In September 2024, counter-terrorism operations in Indonesia led to the arrest of seven individuals from West Sumatra and the Bangka Belitung Islands who were planning to attack then Pope Francis during his visit to the country. In their possession was a (https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-police-detain-seven-in-a-failed-plot-to-attack-pope-francis) DJI mini drone that could potentially have been used for surveillance or an attack. Apart from drones being used in attacks, Indonesian nationals have also been involved in attempting to smuggle drones to militants in the Middle East. Indonesian court documents viewed by this author revealed a syndicate involved in attempting to transport drones and drone components from Indonesia to militants linked to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria through Türkiye. The group had procured a Chinese-made Sonicmodell Sea Rescue fixed-wing drone, a Heewing RC F-01 delta-wing drone, an Indonesian-made Rajawali drone, a Diatone Manba MK4 F722 flight controller stack, and a pair of FPV goggles. Some of the items were procured through open websites, social media, and e-commerce sites such as AliExpress. The drone components were packed alongside foodstuff and transported via commercial post to Türkiye to be then sent to HTS militants in Syria. Indonesian authorities also uncovered the use of cryptocurrency in the financial trails. Key Trends and Outlook The cases of illicit drones in the region point to several trends. First, the use of cheap COTS drones for illicit activity remains a key issue of concern. These drones are easily available, have few purchasing restrictions, and are difficult to regulate given their dual-use nature. With drones becoming increasingly cheap and small, and more private companies/vendors engaging in the sale of these items, criminal and terrorist networks are not going to cease attempting to use these types of drones to enhance their illicit operations. Second, within the crime sphere, narcotics have featured prominently with illicit drone use. Drones are not only being used to smuggle the actual drugs but also used for reconnaissance by these networks to evade detection. In the future, drones could also be used to traffic firearms across borders given the close relationship between illicit firearms and narcotics networks in the region. Drones have been used to traffic firearms across the India-Pakistan border in regions like (https://x.com/DGPPunjabPolice/status/2096857805659804034?s=20) Punjab . While there is no present need for illicit actors in the region to engage more sophisticated systems like fiber optic or FPV drones like the Latin American cartels, for example, this possibility cannot be discounted in the future. Third, drone trafficking and smuggling networks possibly linked to conflict actors and NSAGs continue to exploit mainstream businesses through the use of front companies, commercial transport and logistical pipelines, and human mules to traffic drone parts through countries such as Thailand and Indonesia. The modular nature of some drones and the commercial availability of their associated components often facilitate the illicit smuggling and trafficking of these systems. Given the above trends, counter-drone measures should focus on interdicting illicit supply chain networks, logistical and commercial pipelines, and the human nodes linking these networks together. Government agencies must invest sufficient resources in enhancing their individual counter-drone capabilities, both in terms of hardware and trained personnel, and hardening critical infrastructure such as administrative buildings and public infrastructure against attacks by drones. Countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have already incorporated drones in their law enforcement operations and have set up specialized units within their services, which is a positive way forward. This should be complemented with robust legal frameworks that govern and regulate their use, alongside ensuring comprehensive drone forensics capabilities. To conclude, regional governments must be as innovative and effective in their approach to countering drones as their adversaries are in improvising and using them. Authors Guest Author Rueben Dass Rueben Dass is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, a specialist unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He specializses in terrorist and criminal use of new technologies. 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