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                    "The two Koreas have been close observers of the wars in Ukraine and Iran \u2013 not least because aspects of the conflicts mirror how both sides think they will win a potential war on the peninsula. The ongoing exchange of long-range drones and missiles, in particular, resembles the type of war both Koreas envision for themselves: a deep strike contest. To this end, both have recently begun developing low-cost, long-range attack drones, with some systems slated to be operational in the near term.\u00a0\nLong-range artillery, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons have, so far, shaped each side\u2019s view of the military balance and whether deterrence holds on the peninsula. Armed drones will soon enter the picture.\nThese drones will exacerbate the South Korean military\u2019s existing gaps in surveilling the North. Pyongyang\u2019s growing missile and nuclear arsenal and diversified launch platforms have made the problem acute. With cheap attack drones, North Korea\u2019s ability to disperse, conceal, and employ offensive firepower will further outpace South Korea\u2019s capacity to destroy it.\u00a0\nThis trend is at odds with the Lee administration\u2019s ambitious timeline for gaining wartime operational control from the United States. South Korean forces will need additional capabilities to meet the qualitative conditions previously established by the two allies.\nDrones on the Korean Peninsula\nLong-range drones \u2013 unarmed aerial vehicles with operational range far beyond the forward edge of battle along the armistice line \u2013 have been a feature of the inter-Korean military competition for the past two decades. The first known operational use was in 2010 when a North Korean reconnaissance drone was spotted during the Yonpyeong Island shelling. Since then, periodic drone incursions have been a feature of the inter-Korean low-intensity skirmishes.\u00a0\nIn 2014, South Korea recovered the wreckage of three North Korean drones less than 50 miles from the border. In December 2022, five North Korean drones overflew Seoul, including the presidential office, and returned North. In response, then-President Yoon Suk-yeol floated the idea of South Korean forces conducting reciprocal drone incursions into North Korea. North Korea claimed South Korean drones overflew Pyongyang in October 2024. While officially denied, public analysis of North Korean-released images visually matched developmental South Korean reconnaissance systems.\nRudimentary platforms \u2013 small, fixed-wing, turboprop, and unarmed \u2013 have featured in these largely symbolic aerial incursions so far, alongside unpowered balloons. There is no evidence that either side has employed armed drones in cross-border operations. Drones that had been operationally used on the peninsula, however, represent only a small subset of a broader inventory that includes systems with greater range and capability.\nNorth Korea has been importing Chinese and Soviet drones and has been developing indigenous models for reconnaissance missions since the 1980s. In 2023, North Korea unveiled a high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) reconnaissance drone and a medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) multi-role drone. Both are qualitatively different from its existing unmanned aircraft \u2013 the latter, for example, is capable of firing a missile \u2013 though limited numbers are in the inventory.\u00a0\nFor South Korea, abortive development efforts in the late Cold War resumed in the 1990s with a focus on the tactical surveillance drones supporting the Army\u2019s ground operations. Interest in long-range systems came in the late 2000s when the Agency for Defense Development (ADD) started developing a domestic MALE, KUS-FS, and the Republic of Korea Air Force procured Global Hawks from the United States. Four Global Hawks were delivered by 2020, and the KUS-FS is expected to enter service in 2027.\nThe wars in Ukraine and Iran have catalyzed the two Koreas\u2019 interest in massed, cheap, and armed long-range drones while they continue to invest in large, sophisticated unmanned systems. In 2024, Kim Jong Un ordered officials to \u201cestablish a mass-production system and begin full-scale operation\u201d of \u201csuicide attack drones.\u201d Thousands of North Korean laborers, and possibly engineers, have also reportedly been sent to the Yelabuga factory in Russia producing copies of Iran\u2019s Shahed one-way attack (OWA) drone.\u00a0\nFor South Korea, the ADD is developing the KUS-LM \u2013 dubbed the \u201cK-LUCAS\u201d with reported range and payload figures comparable to the American OWA drone called LUCAS \u2013 with plans to deploy it before 2030. The system has started trials on land and sea.\nTheories of Victory\nThese investments by both Koreas in long-range unmanned systems, for both strike and surveillance, will alter the terms of the inter-Korean military competition. In the past few decades, the main domain of the inter-Korean military competition has become a deep strike-centric contest. The ability to wage a strategic air campaign \u2013 one not directly connected to the ground fight \u2013 is now central to how each side assesses the balance. Both sides appear to believe loitering munitions fit into this air power paradigm.\nNorth Korea has pursued missile and nuclear weapons technology to hold at risk its neighbor and its ally, the United States, with long-range fires. South Korea\u2019s Ministry of National Defense assessed that, in a contingency, North Korea plans a surprise massive firepower attack to create favorable conditions and force a rapid end to the war. Even absent an offensive intent, the threat of catastrophic damage from nuclear missiles and conventional munitions that bypass defenses creates a powerful deterrent intended to prevent attack and ensure regime survival.\u00a0\nUnder Kim Jong Un\u2019s rule, North Korea has expanded its missile force to deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads deep into South Korea and, increasingly, beyond the peninsula. The nuclear arsenal, too, has increased both numerically and in centrality to North Korea\u2019s security policy. The KPA Ground Force also operates thousands of artillery pieces \u2013 with sufficient range to reach Seoul \u2013 out of hardened sites concentrated south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line.\nNorth Korea appears to see drones as a complementary element of its deep strike strategy, enabled by mass, concealment, and dispersal. Indeed, Kim Jong Un noted three attributes that make OWA drones a needed investment for the Korean People\u2019s Army: low production cost, simple manufacturing process, and ease of integration into existing firepower. Drone salvos launched in conjunction with ballistic and cruise missiles could overwhelm South Korea\u2019s air and missile defenses. Their relatively low cost also reduces the economic burden of procurement on North Korea\u2019s constrained economy.\u00a0\nIn response to a nuclear-armed adversary and fear of abandonment from its ally, South Korea has pursued a counterforce \u201cThree Axis system\u201d to serve as a non-nuclear deterrent. This idea has seen iterative conceptual updates over the past decade. Today, the approach rests on a three-pronged framework that combines preemptive strikes on North Korean nuclear and missile facilities (\u201cKill Chain\u201d), multi-layered missile defense (Air Force-operated \u201cKorea Air and Missile Defense\u201d against ballistic missiles and the Army\u2019s in-development \u201cLow-Altitude Missile Defense\u201d against artillery and short-range rockets), and overwhelming retaliatory firepower against military and leadership targets (\u201cKorea Massive Punishment and Retaliation\u201d).\nEfforts in the past five years have sought to integrate drones into the strategy. The Yoon administration established the Drone Operations Command in September 2023 with an explicit mission to develop an offensive concept of operations \u2013 before that, South Korea\u2019s military had only used drones for reconnaissance and surveillance. Despite initial criticism of the command as redundant, and its subsequent disestablishment for its implication in Yoon\u2019s 2024 self-coup attempt, the South Korean defense community appears to acknowledge the need for this function. The mission continues in the Defense Drone headquarters, the recently formed successor body that focuses on force development, manning, and equipping \u2013 albeit shedding any operational role to the services.\nSouth Korea\u2019s Surveillance Problems\nDeterrence on the peninsula holds today as both sides possess long-range strike assets that impose what, for now, are unacceptable risks and costs if the shooting starts. While ground forces remain important in both Koreas\u2019 force structures, the main arena of the inter-Korean competition today lies in deep strike. The drone incursions in the past decade and a half introduced an additional low-intensity element to this competition. The development and eventual deployment of armed drones will create new requirements for South Korea to operationalize its Three Axis strategy and for the United States to defend its treaty ally.\nSouth Korea\u2019s limited intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capacity stands out as a glaring vulnerability in anticipating this future. All three \u201caxes\u201d of its strategy depend on a near-perfect and near-persistent intelligence picture over North Korea, to monitor leadership movements, locate concealed facilities, track mobile missile launchers and submarines, identify incoming missiles \u2013 and now, detect drone launch sites and their launches. This is a tall order. South Korea\u2019s ISR capabilities have long been identified as a weakness, as it historically has relied on U.S. capabilities.\u00a0\nISR drones and additional ISR satellites are intended to supplement existing gaps to operationalize the Three Axis strategy, but even with systems expected to come online in the next five years, mobile targets will remain difficult to find, fix, and track. South Korea\u2019s space-based ISR layer, in development since 2023, leaves roughly 2-hour windows between observation opportunities over potential launch sites. The South Korean Army\u2019s Low Altitude Missile Defense, expected to come online in 2029, was designed to counter artillery threats and may be constrained by insufficient interceptors and sensor networks against drone salvos.\u00a0\nThus, in the near to medium term, North Korea\u2019s ability to disperse, conceal, and employ its drones, missiles, and nuclear weapons will outpace South Korea\u2019s capacity to destroy them. In fact, North Korea\u2019s rapid operationalization of OWA drones may require greater dedication of U.S. ISR assets to the peninsula.\nThe added challenge to South Korea\u2019s defense strategy thus poses questions about the Lee administration\u2019s ambitious push for wartime operational control transfer by the end of his term in 2030. The proposed change to the command structure of U.S. and South Korean forces has been tied to improvements in South Korea\u2019s capabilities to lead the Combined Forces Command, including the capacity to operate its own ISR assets to meet operational requirements. The Lee administration has insisted on \u201cno additional conditions\u201d being placed on the transfer requirements. Yet, the deteriorating military balance in this domain will necessitate additional capability to meet the established qualitative conditions for making major changes to the Combined Force.\nThe author appreciates feedback from colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies \u2013 Pat Bazylczyk, Mark Cancian, Emma Gargiulo, and Andy Lim \u2013 and the 2026 cohort of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy Korea fellowship."
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