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By Olli Pekka Suorsa October 09, 2026 (Share on LinkedIn) (https://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2F2026%2F10%2Fdebunking-alarmist-narratives-on-the-china-air-base-in-laos%2F&title=Debunking+Alarmist+Narratives+on+the+%E2%80%98China+Air+Base%E2%80%99+in+Laos) (Share on Facebook) (https://www.facebook.com/sharer.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2F2026%2F10%2Fdebunking-alarmist-narratives-on-the-china-air-base-in-laos%2F) (Share on Bluesky) (https://bsky.app/intent/compose?text=Debunking+Alarmist+Narratives+on+the+%E2%80%98China+Air+Base%E2%80%99+in+Laos%0Ahttps%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2F2026%2F10%2Fdebunking-alarmist-narratives-on-the-china-air-base-in-laos%2F) (Share on X) (https://twitter.com/intent/tweet?text=Debunking+Alarmist+Narratives+on+the+%E2%80%98China+Air+Base%E2%80%99+in+Laos&url=https%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2F2026%2F10%2Fdebunking-alarmist-narratives-on-the-china-air-base-in-laos%2F) (Debunking Alarmist Narratives on the ‘China Air Base’ in Laos) (Debunking Alarmist Narratives on the ‘China Air Base’ in Laos) A satellite image shows the construction of the China-backed air strip in Ban Keun, Vientiane province, Laos, Jan. 3, 2026. Credit: Google Earth/The Diplomat (https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions/) Subscribe for ads-free reading The (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202609/1371572.shtml) opening of the Laos-China Joint Support and Training Center and the Friendship Aviation Academy in Ban Keun, Laos on September 29 has sparked an intense media storm. China hawks claim that the innocuous airfield represents Beijing’s (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-opens-rare-joint-military-support-centre-laos-2026-09-29/) third overseas military base, following the Djibouti facility in East Africa and the Ream Naval Support facility in Cambodia, and the first Chinese air base in Southeast Asia. International media has (https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/08/world/asia/china-military-base-laos.html) framed the Ban Keun facility as a “base” or an “air base,” and the training aircraft spotted on satellite imagery as “ (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/attack-aircraft-military-vehicles-visible-new-china-laos-base-satellite-images-2026-10-06/) attack aircraft ” or “light attack aircraft.” Further, alarmists warn that China could (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-carves-new-military-presence-southeast-asian-neighbour-2026-09-30/) extend the airfield’s runway and expand its infrastructure to enable power projection across mainland Southeast Asia and beyond, or to (https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3370136/why-chinas-new-air-force-base-laos-could-rattle-vietnam) use the facility for intelligence collection. Still others have proposed that an enlarged base could (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-to-make-of-china-s-new-air-facility-in-laos) facilitate bomber operations or to out-flank or (https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3370136/why-chinas-new-air-force-base-laos-could-rattle-vietnam) surround Vietnam. Critically, however, whether due to intentional framing or simple ignorance, many of the above claims lack evidence and realism. This article attempts to debunk some of the more persistent and glaring narratives repeated in the media and expert commentary regarding the new airfield and its purpose. First, images of Ban Keun airfield taken by a commercial satellite provider Vantor and shared first by (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/attack-aircraft-military-vehicles-visible-new-china-laos-base-satellite-images-2026-10-06/) Reuters show eight Chinese-made JL-8/K-8 basic jet trainer aircraft on the facility’s apron. The aircraft are termed as “light attack aircraft” or “attack aircraft” by media. That is an inaccurate framing, making the aircraft appear more threatening by nature than they actually are. The K-8 is a joint China-Pakistan training aircraft project, operated by many countries, including in the region by China, Laos, Myanmar, and Pakistan, among others. The K-8 is (https://chinese-military-aviation.blogspot.com/p/trainers.html) primarily a basic or intermediate training aircraft. The type typically feeds into phases two and three of a flight training syllabus, like introduction to jet flight and advanced jet training, and an introduction to tactical flight, before moving on to more advanced and higher performance trainers. In the Lao People’s Liberation Army Air Force (LPLAAF), the phase one elementary (https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/defence/china-laos-inaugurate-joint-aviation-training-facilities-at-ban-keun) training is carried out on Chinese-build SAIC LE-500, the K-8 is used in the phase two and three basic jet training, and the Russian YAK-130 is used for phase four tactical training. Unlike Myanmar’s air force, which has reportedly (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/aircraft-02062024165418.html) employed the K-8 in a light attack role, there is no evidence of LPLAAF use of the type in that role. Tellingly, no visual evidence of the type participating in exercises or carrying air-to-ground munitions has surfaced in the aircraft’s almost a decade of service in Laos. Thus, framing the Laotian K-8 as a “light attack aircraft” is simply an inaccurate description, which causes confusion and alarm. In contrast, the Russian advanced jet trainer is a substantially more capable platform than the K-8 and can be (https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2019-01-21/laos-receives-yak-130-combat-jet-trainers) armed with various air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions for ground support. Another persistent (https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/china-laos-ban-keun-military-training-center/) claim suggests that Ban Keun airfield is a Chinese “air base” with a long runway and a “large” apron for aircraft parking, supposedly capable of supporting Chinese military power projection across mainland Southeast Asia. However, the airfield’s single (https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/china-laos-ban-keun-military-training-center/) runway is approximately 2,000 meters in length, which, in fact, is not very long for a military airfield. Other major LPLAAF operating locations like the Wattay International Airport in Vientiane and Xieng Khouang (Phonsavan) air base have runways extending to approximately 3,000 m and 2,500 m, respectively, measured in Google Earth. By way of comparison, neighboring Thailand’s military airfields are generally built to 3,000 m length. Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) fighter bases in the Southern Theater Command area have 2,500 m runways, while bomber bases at Shaodong and Leiyang have longer, 3,000 m runways. The 2,000 m runway at Ban Keun was not built to support power projection but, instead, to handle training aircraft. In addition, (https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/china-laos-ban-keun-military-training-center/) claims that the facility has a large apron for aircraft parking and (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/attack-aircraft-military-vehicles-visible-new-china-laos-base-satellite-images-2026-10-06/) potential for significant expansion to support power projection are also incorrect. Judged from the available satellite imagery, the airfield’s apron is in fact relatively small and can only support a dozen trainers with associated sun shelters, hangars, and maintenance infrastructure. To support sustained power projection operations, the airfield should have truly vast aprons, numerous aircraft shelters, and large fuel and munitions “farms,” which can be seen in similar imagery from Chinese air bases across the border. None of this is visible at Ban Keun. What can be parsed out is an airfield with modest infrastructure suitable for the stated intended training role. Some (https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3370136/why-chinas-new-air-force-base-laos-could-rattle-vietnam) experts have proposed that together with the Cambodia-China Support Center in Ream (often framed as a Chinese naval base), the Ban Keun “air base” will help China “encircle” Vietnam. Writing for the Interpreter, Hunter Marston (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-to-make-of-china-s-new-air-facility-in-laos) suggested that “Beijing has effectively pulled off an end run around Hanoi’s air and maritime flanks.” Such statements demonstrate limited understanding of air power’s key attributes and China’s existing military posture and options to project power in the South China Sea or mainland Southeast Asia. Air power allows maneuver in the third dimension (altitude). Its key (https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_1/AFDP-1.pdf) attributes – speed, reach, and ability to overfly any terrain – provide military aircraft significant operational flexibility. The PLAAF does not have to base its combat aircraft physically in Laos to attempt to “surround” or “encircle” Vietnam. It can do so from its current bases within (https://jamestown.org/snapshot-chinas-southern-theater-command/) the Southern Theater Command and the South China Sea. Under the Southern Theater Command, the PLAAF has an extensive (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Modern-Chinese-Warplanes-Combat-Aircraft/dp/0997309261) network of well-equipped air bases that stretch from Hunan and Guangdong provinces in China’s southeast to Guangxi and Yunnan provinces in the south, directly bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. In addition, Hainan Island, Woody Island in the Paracels, and Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef in the Spratlys (https://amti.csis.org/chinese-power-projection/) provide the PLAAF with a chain of well-equipped operating locations for any regional contingency. Importantly, from its current bases, such as Mengzi in Yunnan Province or Bose/Tianyang in Guangxi Province, PLAAF combat aircraft can comfortably reach anywhere in mainland Southeast Asia. Moreover, operating from China’s Spratly outposts, the PLAAF can reach nearly all corners of the subregion. The reach of China’s air power can be further expanded by the (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-grows-its-air-air-refueling-capacity-eye-taiwan) growing fleet of indigenous aerial refueling aircraft. The PLAAF’s primary combat aircraft in the Southern Theater Command (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Modern-Chinese-Warplanes-Combat-Aircraft/dp/0997309261) area of operations – such as the JH-7A, Su-30MKK, J-16, and J-20 – are designed for long combat radius, extending from 600 nautical miles to up to 1,000 nm. The smaller J-10C can also reach more than 600 nm with drop tanks. With such operational flexibility, PLAAF strike aircraft can execute multipronged attacks against targets up to central Vietnam from their existing bases. Dispatched from Woody Island or Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea, Chinese fighters can easily cover the entirety of Vietnam and more, offering options for multiple approaches. As a result, there is no reason for Beijing to position its bombers forward to the Ban Keun airfield to project power across mainland Southeast Asia and the Gulf of Thailand and Gulf of Bengal in conflict. With an (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Modern-Chinese-Warplanes-Combat-Aircraft/dp/0997309261) estimated combat radius of 1,350 nm combined with the use of long-range precision-guided weapons, China’s H-6K bombers can cover all the above areas while operating from their home bases at Shaodong and Leiyang in Hunan Province. Any forward deployment of Chinese bombers would occur within the Southern Theater Command area, Hainan Island, or the Spratlys, offering the PLAAF multiple options and operational flexibility. Experts have suggested also that China could deploy spy aircraft, surveillance radars, and signals intelligence gathering systems to Ban Keun. Commenting on the matter for the South China Morning Post, Abdul Rahman Yaacob (https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3370136/why-chinas-new-air-force-base-laos-could-rattle-vietnam) proposed that China could use the facility for “keeping an eye on Vietnam” and to “monitor air activities deep into Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.” Others have noted that the facility offers improved (https://thediplomat.com/2026/10/the-strategic-implications-of-chinas-military-facility-in-laos/) reach for Chinese spy planes to monitor U.S. military activity up to the Singapore Strait. However, it is unclear from such commentary what the purpose of increased monitoring of mainland Southeast Asia is. Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia all hold very close relations with Beijing. When it comes to Vietnam, which has maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, Hanoi’s military bases can be easily monitored from Southern Theater Command area of operations, with little additional benefit from dispatching such capabilities to Laos. These assertions are among the most frequently disseminated narratives regarding the Laos-China Support and Training Center. Many are pure speculation that fuels unnecessary alarmism – particularly those that lack evidence and demonstrate a limited understanding of air power, its key attributes, and China’s regional air projection capabilities. What the (http://eng.mod.gov.cn/2025xb/D/V/16490652.html) official statements and available evidence suggest is that the Ban Keun facility is a joint training facility to help the LPLAAF develop its capacity for the future and meet its own modernization goals. China has assisted the Lao air force (and the broader civil aviation sector) not just through hardware sales (i.e., the LE-500 and JL-8 for the LPLAAF and the C-909 for the Lao Airlines) but also by developing the entire aviation ecosystem, including infrastructure, management, maintenance, and training. This is the context in which the Laos-China Joint Support and Training Center and the Friendship Aviation Academy should be viewed. Already have an account? Log in . You have reached the limit of 2 free articles this month. Get to the bottom of the story (https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions) Subscribe today and join thousands of diplomats, analysts, policy professionals and business readers who rely on The Diplomat for expert Asia-Pacific coverage. Get unlimited access to in-depth analysis you won't find anywhere else, from South China Sea tensions to ASEAN diplomacy to India-Pakistan relations. More than 5,000 articles a year. Unlimited articles and expert analysis Weekly newsletter with exclusive insights 16-year archive of diplomatic coverage Ad-free reading on all devices Support independent journalism (https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions) Subscribe Now (https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions) View Subscription Options Already have an account? Log in . The (https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202609/1371572.shtml) opening of the Laos-China Joint Support and Training Center and the Friendship Aviation Academy in Ban Keun, Laos on September 29 has sparked an intense media storm. China hawks claim that the innocuous airfield represents Beijing’s (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-opens-rare-joint-military-support-centre-laos-2026-09-29/) third overseas military base, following the Djibouti facility in East Africa and the Ream Naval Support facility in Cambodia, and the first Chinese air base in Southeast Asia. International media has (https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/08/world/asia/china-military-base-laos.html) framed the Ban Keun facility as a “base” or an “air base,” and the training aircraft spotted on satellite imagery as “ (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/attack-aircraft-military-vehicles-visible-new-china-laos-base-satellite-images-2026-10-06/) attack aircraft ” or “light attack aircraft.” Further, alarmists warn that China could (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-carves-new-military-presence-southeast-asian-neighbour-2026-09-30/) extend the airfield’s runway and expand its infrastructure to enable power projection across mainland Southeast Asia and beyond, or to (https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3370136/why-chinas-new-air-force-base-laos-could-rattle-vietnam) use the facility for intelligence collection. Still others have proposed that an enlarged base could (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-to-make-of-china-s-new-air-facility-in-laos) facilitate bomber operations or to out-flank or (https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3370136/why-chinas-new-air-force-base-laos-could-rattle-vietnam) surround Vietnam. Critically, however, whether due to intentional framing or simple ignorance, many of the above claims lack evidence and realism. This article attempts to debunk some of the more persistent and glaring narratives repeated in the media and expert commentary regarding the new airfield and its purpose. First, images of Ban Keun airfield taken by a commercial satellite provider Vantor and shared first by (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/attack-aircraft-military-vehicles-visible-new-china-laos-base-satellite-images-2026-10-06/) Reuters show eight Chinese-made JL-8/K-8 basic jet trainer aircraft on the facility’s apron. The aircraft are termed as “light attack aircraft” or “attack aircraft” by media. That is an inaccurate framing, making the aircraft appear more threatening by nature than they actually are. The K-8 is a joint China-Pakistan training aircraft project, operated by many countries, including in the region by China, Laos, Myanmar, and Pakistan, among others. The K-8 is (https://chinese-military-aviation.blogspot.com/p/trainers.html) primarily a basic or intermediate training aircraft. The type typically feeds into phases two and three of a flight training syllabus, like introduction to jet flight and advanced jet training, and an introduction to tactical flight, before moving on to more advanced and higher performance trainers. In the Lao People’s Liberation Army Air Force (LPLAAF), the phase one elementary (https://www.janes.com/defence-intelligence-insights/defence-news/defence/china-laos-inaugurate-joint-aviation-training-facilities-at-ban-keun) training is carried out on Chinese-build SAIC LE-500, the K-8 is used in the phase two and three basic jet training, and the Russian YAK-130 is used for phase four tactical training. Unlike Myanmar’s air force, which has reportedly (https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/aircraft-02062024165418.html) employed the K-8 in a light attack role, there is no evidence of LPLAAF use of the type in that role. Tellingly, no visual evidence of the type participating in exercises or carrying air-to-ground munitions has surfaced in the aircraft’s almost a decade of service in Laos. Thus, framing the Laotian K-8 as a “light attack aircraft” is simply an inaccurate description, which causes confusion and alarm. In contrast, the Russian advanced jet trainer is a substantially more capable platform than the K-8 and can be (https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2019-01-21/laos-receives-yak-130-combat-jet-trainers) armed with various air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions for ground support. Another persistent (https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/china-laos-ban-keun-military-training-center/) claim suggests that Ban Keun airfield is a Chinese “air base” with a long runway and a “large” apron for aircraft parking, supposedly capable of supporting Chinese military power projection across mainland Southeast Asia. However, the airfield’s single (https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/china-laos-ban-keun-military-training-center/) runway is approximately 2,000 meters in length, which, in fact, is not very long for a military airfield. Other major LPLAAF operating locations like the Wattay International Airport in Vientiane and Xieng Khouang (Phonsavan) air base have runways extending to approximately 3,000 m and 2,500 m, respectively, measured in Google Earth. By way of comparison, neighboring Thailand’s military airfields are generally built to 3,000 m length. Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) fighter bases in the Southern Theater Command area have 2,500 m runways, while bomber bases at Shaodong and Leiyang have longer, 3,000 m runways. The 2,000 m runway at Ban Keun was not built to support power projection but, instead, to handle training aircraft. In addition, (https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/china-laos-ban-keun-military-training-center/) claims that the facility has a large apron for aircraft parking and (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/attack-aircraft-military-vehicles-visible-new-china-laos-base-satellite-images-2026-10-06/) potential for significant expansion to support power projection are also incorrect. Judged from the available satellite imagery, the airfield’s apron is in fact relatively small and can only support a dozen trainers with associated sun shelters, hangars, and maintenance infrastructure. To support sustained power projection operations, the airfield should have truly vast aprons, numerous aircraft shelters, and large fuel and munitions “farms,” which can be seen in similar imagery from Chinese air bases across the border. None of this is visible at Ban Keun. What can be parsed out is an airfield with modest infrastructure suitable for the stated intended training role. Some (https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3370136/why-chinas-new-air-force-base-laos-could-rattle-vietnam) experts have proposed that together with the Cambodia-China Support Center in Ream (often framed as a Chinese naval base), the Ban Keun “air base” will help China “encircle” Vietnam. Writing for the Interpreter, Hunter Marston (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-to-make-of-china-s-new-air-facility-in-laos) suggested that “Beijing has effectively pulled off an end run around Hanoi’s air and maritime flanks.” Such statements demonstrate limited understanding of air power’s key attributes and China’s existing military posture and options to project power in the South China Sea or mainland Southeast Asia. Air power allows maneuver in the third dimension (altitude). Its key (https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_1/AFDP-1.pdf) attributes – speed, reach, and ability to overfly any terrain – provide military aircraft significant operational flexibility. The PLAAF does not have to base its combat aircraft physically in Laos to attempt to “surround” or “encircle” Vietnam. It can do so from its current bases within (https://jamestown.org/snapshot-chinas-southern-theater-command/) the Southern Theater Command and the South China Sea. Under the Southern Theater Command, the PLAAF has an extensive (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Modern-Chinese-Warplanes-Combat-Aircraft/dp/0997309261) network of well-equipped air bases that stretch from Hunan and Guangdong provinces in China’s southeast to Guangxi and Yunnan provinces in the south, directly bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar. In addition, Hainan Island, Woody Island in the Paracels, and Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef in the Spratlys (https://amti.csis.org/chinese-power-projection/) provide the PLAAF with a chain of well-equipped operating locations for any regional contingency. Importantly, from its current bases, such as Mengzi in Yunnan Province or Bose/Tianyang in Guangxi Province, PLAAF combat aircraft can comfortably reach anywhere in mainland Southeast Asia. Moreover, operating from China’s Spratly outposts, the PLAAF can reach nearly all corners of the subregion. The reach of China’s air power can be further expanded by the (https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-grows-its-air-air-refueling-capacity-eye-taiwan) growing fleet of indigenous aerial refueling aircraft. The PLAAF’s primary combat aircraft in the Southern Theater Command (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Modern-Chinese-Warplanes-Combat-Aircraft/dp/0997309261) area of operations – such as the JH-7A, Su-30MKK, J-16, and J-20 – are designed for long combat radius, extending from 600 nautical miles to up to 1,000 nm. The smaller J-10C can also reach more than 600 nm with drop tanks. With such operational flexibility, PLAAF strike aircraft can execute multipronged attacks against targets up to central Vietnam from their existing bases. Dispatched from Woody Island or Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea, Chinese fighters can easily cover the entirety of Vietnam and more, offering options for multiple approaches. As a result, there is no reason for Beijing to position its bombers forward to the Ban Keun airfield to project power across mainland Southeast Asia and the Gulf of Thailand and Gulf of Bengal in conflict. With an (https://www.amazon.co.uk/Modern-Chinese-Warplanes-Combat-Aircraft/dp/0997309261) estimated combat radius of 1,350 nm combined with the use of long-range precision-guided weapons, China’s H-6K bombers can cover all the above areas while operating from their home bases at Shaodong and Leiyang in Hunan Province. Any forward deployment of Chinese bombers would occur within the Southern Theater Command area, Hainan Island, or the Spratlys, offering the PLAAF multiple options and operational flexibility. Experts have suggested also that China could deploy spy aircraft, surveillance radars, and signals intelligence gathering systems to Ban Keun. Commenting on the matter for the South China Morning Post, Abdul Rahman Yaacob (https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3370136/why-chinas-new-air-force-base-laos-could-rattle-vietnam) proposed that China could use the facility for “keeping an eye on Vietnam” and to “monitor air activities deep into Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.” Others have noted that the facility offers improved (https://thediplomat.com/2026/10/the-strategic-implications-of-chinas-military-facility-in-laos/) reach for Chinese spy planes to monitor U.S. military activity up to the Singapore Strait. However, it is unclear from such commentary what the purpose of increased monitoring of mainland Southeast Asia is. Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia all hold very close relations with Beijing. When it comes to Vietnam, which has maritime disputes with China in the South China Sea, Hanoi’s military bases can be easily monitored from Southern Theater Command area of operations, with little additional benefit from dispatching such capabilities to Laos. These assertions are among the most frequently disseminated narratives regarding the Laos-China Support and Training Center. Many are pure speculation that fuels unnecessary alarmism – particularly those that lack evidence and demonstrate a limited understanding of air power, its key attributes, and China’s regional air projection capabilities. What the (http://eng.mod.gov.cn/2025xb/D/V/16490652.html) official statements and available evidence suggest is that the Ban Keun facility is a joint training facility to help the LPLAAF develop its capacity for the future and meet its own modernization goals. China has assisted the Lao air force (and the broader civil aviation sector) not just through hardware sales (i.e., the LE-500 and JL-8 for the LPLAAF and the C-909 for the Lao Airlines) but also by developing the entire aviation ecosystem, including infrastructure, management, maintenance, and training. This is the context in which the Laos-China Joint Support and Training Center and the Friendship Aviation Academy should be viewed. Authors Guest Author Olli Pekka Suorsa Olli Pekka Suorsa is an assistant professor at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi, the U.A.E. 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