Over the summer, Russia intensified its use of jet-powered one-way attack drones. Flying faster and higher than the propeller-driven Shahed-136s (or Geran-2s as Russia calls their copies) that have been terrorizing Ukraine for years, these weapons are far harder to intercept. We predicted this would happen over three years ago when Iran first introduced its jet-powered Shahed-238, which itself was an adaptation of the Shahed-136. Initial variants of Russia’s copy of that drone, called the Geran-3, first appeared over the skies of Ukraine in early 2024. By mid-2025 they were becoming a real problem. Since then, the latest higher-performance variant of this weapon, the Geran-4, has added great strain to Ukraine’s dwindling air defense resources and is the source of increasing levels of destruction across the country.
The Geran-4 appeared last May, according to the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate (GUR). Unlike the Geran-3, which largely used a modified Shahed-136 airframe, the new drone has one purpose-built for higher-speed flight because “the structural strength [of the older model] was insufficient for high-speed flights, and even less so for maneuvering under high G-loads,” GUR noted.
The Geran-4’s new airframe features a blended air intake and overall “improved aerodynamic efficiency, a reinforced structure, and a turbojet engine with increased thrust,” GUR stated. “The wings are now permanently integrated into the center wing section. To reduce air resistance, the number of technological hatches on the fuselage has been minimized.”
In an overnight attack across Ukraine that lasted until Monday, “Russia launched 165 drones overnight, 79 of them jet-powered, the Air Force reported. Air defenses downed or suppressed 112, and hits were recorded at 14 locations.” You can see the aftermath of one of those attacks in the following video.
Recently, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) got its hands on one of these weapons. Its report offers the best view yet of what makes these drones so dangerous.
The Geran-4 is “a new, faster version of the attack drone that is proving harder for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept,” the report states. “We were given a rare opportunity to literally take this surviving drone apart and find out what makes it so much faster, more maneuverable, and more accurate.”
“The first part we uncover is the turbojet engine. It is one of the Geran-4’s most significant upgrades, allowing the drone to fly at altitudes of up to eight kilometers,” the report explained. “That’s twice as high as the older propeller-powered drones. According to specialists, drones equipped with this type of engine have already flown from Russia-occupied Crimea to Lutsk in northwestern Ukraine, a distance of more than 700 kilometers.”
“This engine allows it to fly at speeds of up to 450 to 500 kilometers per hour over Ukrainian territory. Sometimes even faster,” RFE/RL proffered. “It flies fast and high, which is why it is still difficult to intercept.”
As the camera pans down over the engine, the reporters noted that while it is made in China, “we have investigated cases where these engines were assembled in Russia using Chinese components.”
The next component examined was the drone’s camera.
“It has several modes: daylight, night vision, and infrared,” the report stated. “The camera offers 10-times optical zoom and up to 32-times digital zoom, allowing the drone operator to view terrain from an altitude of eight kilometers.”
“If there is a relay station and it is connected to the network, an operator sitting in an automated workstation somewhere in Bryansk, Oryol, or Crimea can control the drone and guide it to its target,” RFE/RL stated.
“Once the drone is inside Ukraine, regular cellular SIM cards can help keep it connected,” the report continued. “We also found two GSM modems inside this drone. Using SIM cards, they can transmit the Geran-4’s location over mobile networks, allowing the operator to track it in real time.”
Back in 2024, we explained how Shaheds fitted with 4G modems and SIM cards from Ukrainian telecom firms, combined with a camera installed on the drone and the ability to use wireless networks, could be one of a number of avenues that would transform the Shahed into a relatively long-range reconnaissance and strike asset capable of beyond-line-of-sight real-time operations. This could help plug what at the time was a glaring gap in the Russian arsenal, although the stability of its connectivity is still unknown and providing man-in-the-loop guidances in real-time for strikes may be beyond the capabilities of this configuration, at least consistently.
Regardless, most of these drones do not have cameras or modems, they fly to a specific set of coordinates and dive on a target before detonating.
The following images offered a glimpse into that system.
Drone specialists who have investigated the remains of these weapons told the outlet that they had found SIM cards “from Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and even some European Union countries. And the deeper we go inside the drone, the more foreign-made components we find.”
The RFE/RL team also found a Chinese mesh modem the Russians use to help guide the drone.
“It’s responsible, among other things, for radio and video communications. Essentially, this device allows the drone operator to see the video feed from the Geran-4 almost in real time,” RFE/RL stated. “The modem has a range of up to 300 kilometers and can also act as a signal relay. That means several drones flying near each other can relay and strengthen the signal, making it possible to control them over much greater distances.”
The discovery of the Chinese mesh modem illustrates something we reported earlier this year: “For some time now, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, a feature that was confirmed when they started to appear with cameras and cellular modems, something TWZ explored in detail at the time. These developments allow the drone to be connected to an operator. Standard Shaheds fly autonomous routes to pre-planned targets on autopilot with no man-in-the-loop control. They are ‘fire and forget’ weapons.“
“Meanwhile, the range at which MITL can be achieved has been steadily increased. At first, the drones were adapted to exploit patchy cellular networks to provide additional connectivity when available. More recently, Shaheds have been flying with antennas allowing for direct line-of-sight control close to the front lines. This allows them to hit targets dynamically like an FPV drone, while packing a much heavier punch and being able to loiter for long periods of time. You can read all about this development here. Now, the datalink range is being extended using airborne signal relays, possibly creating a mesh network with multiple line-of-sight links.”