{
    "byline": null,
    "charset": "UTF-8",
    "dir": null,
    "excerpt": "ABSTRACT\n\n\n\n   In May 2003, the University of Wisconsin - Madison found that it was\n   the recipient of a continuous large scale flood of inbound Internet\n   traffic destined for one of the campus' public Network Time Protocol\n   (NTP) servers. The flood traffic rate was hundreds-of-thousands\n   of packets-per-second, and hundreds of megabits-per-second.\n\n   Subsequently, we have determined the sources of this flooding to be\n   literally hundreds of thousands of real Internet hosts throughout\n   the world. However, rather than having originated as a malicious\n   distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, the root cause is\n   actually a serious flaw in the design of hundreds of thousands of\n   one vendor's low-cost Internet products targeted for residential\n   use. The unexpected behavior of these products presents a\n   significant operational problem for UW-Madison for years to come.\n\n   This document includes the initial public disclosure of details of\n   these products' serious design flaw. Furthermore, it discusses our\n   ongoing, multifaceted approach toward the solution which involves\n   the University, the products' manufacturer, the relevant Internet\n   standards (RFCs), and the public Internet service and user\n   communities.",
    "lang": null,
    "length": 55164,
    "publishedTime": null,
    "siteName": null,
    "title": "Flawed Routers Flood University of Wisconsin Internet Time Server"
}