A cognitive warfare effort falsely portraying Russian advances as sweeping across the battlefield is framed as usual, that Ukraine and its Western partners should capitulate to Russia’s demands
US Central Intelligence Agency Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow suggests that Russia may be preparing to conduct an act of aggression against a NATO member in the relatively near term to invalidate NATO’s Article 5. A near-term Russian attack is highly unlikely to involve a full-scale conventional invasion of a NATO state. * The nature of the Russian threat that the US is reportedly attempting to deter in 2026 is significantly different from the threat of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late 2021. * The Kremlin continues to deflect Western concerns and deny any intention of conducting aggression against NATO, but these statements are part of a larger effort to create ambiguity and to degrade the alliance’s resolve to counter Russian threats. * Baltic state officials and government-affiliated analysts emphasized that NATO should take the Russian threat seriously but that their immediate threat assessment has not changed. * Russia may conduct air, missile, or drone strikes or a limited incursion against one or more Baltic states to test and seek to break NATO’s resolve to invoke and respond under Article 5. * Several unidentified drones entered Moldovan airspace on the night of August 26 to 27, demonstrating that the Kremlin continues to accept the risk that Russia’s war against Ukraine can cause damage to other states, including Moldova and NATO states bordering Ukraine. * Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov continues to make greatly exaggerated claims of Russian advances that do not match battlefield realities in order to construct a narrative of pervasive Russian military success. * Gerasimov’s exaggerated claims of advance are part of a broader cognitive warfare effort to falsely portray Russian advances as sweeping across the battlefield such that Ukraine and its Western partners should capitulate to Russia’s demands in negotiations. * Russia launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles, an unspecified number of Iskander-M and KN-23 ballistic missiles, and 258 drones against Ukraine overnight. * Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian military assets and Ozon (another Russian analogue to Amazon and Wildberries’ main competitor) logistics facilities in Russia. * Russian forces recently advanced in northern Sumy Oblast and in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported on August 27 that Russian forces launched two Onyx anti-ship missiles from occupied Crimea, an unspecified number of Iskander-M or KN-23 ballistic missiles from Bryansk and Kursk oblasts, and 258 Shahed- and Gerbera-type strike drones, Banderol loitering munitions, and Parodiya-type decoy drones from the directions of Kursk and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; occupied Donetsk City; and occupied Hvardiiske, Crimea.[67]
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted seven Iskander-M or KN-23 ballistic missiles, one Onyx anti-ship missile, three Banderol loitering munitions, and 222 drones; that an unspecified number of air vehicles struck 15 locations; and that drone debris fell on 11 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck residential, critical, agricultural, educational, commercial, logistical, industrial, gas, and energy infrastructure in Poltava, Sumy, Kherson, Kharkiv, Odesa, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts.[68]
A Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada member reported that Russian forces launched five North Korean missiles against the Zaporizhstal steel plant in Zaporizhzhia City on the night of August 27.[69] The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy reported on August 27 that Russian strikes caused power outages in Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts.[70]
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on August 27 that Russian forces used the 9M723-2 Iskander-1000 ballistic missile, an updated version of the Iskander-M, for the first time during an unspecified missile strike against Kyiv in Summer 2026.[71] The GUR noted that the Iskander-1000 missile is part of the new Bora-M system and has a larger engine and launcher compared to the Iskander-M, allowing it to strike targets at a distance of up to 550 kilometers.
Ukraine's Air Force says 233 Russian aerial targets were downed or suppressed overnight, including 1 Oniks missile, 7 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles, 3 S8000 Banderol missiles and 222 drones. Russia launched 258 drones, about a third jet-powered. Strikes were recorded at 15… pic.twitter.com/JlKg3R06Sy
Ukrainian drones struck an Ozon warehouse in Blagoveshchensk, Bashkortostan Republic (roughly 1,200 kilometers from the international border), according to geolocated footage published on August 27.[31] The Ozon Headquarters press service acknowledged on August 27 that Ukrainian drones struck and damaged an Ozon logistics facility in Ufa, Bashkortostan Republic (just south of Blagoveshchensk) and that a missile alert in Orenburg City (roughly 1,100 kilometers from the international border) forced Ozon to evacuate its facility in the city.[32]
Ukrainian and open sources provided updated battle damage assessments (BDA) of recent Ukrainian strikes against oil infrastructure in Krasnodar Krai and Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.
The Ukrainian General Staff confirmed that an August 25 Ukrainian strike against the Afipsky oil refinery in Afipsky, Krasnodar Krai, (roughly 375 kilometers from the frontline) damaged an ELOU-AT processing unit, a gas fractionation unit, and a pipeline section.[33]
Reuters confirmed on August 26, citing three industry sources, that an August 26 Ukrainian drone strike against Lukoil‘s NORSI oil refinery in Kstovo, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (roughly 775 kilometers from the frontline) damaged several processing units, inter-unit infrastructure, and general plant facilities, forcing the refinery to indefinitely suspend crude oil processing.[34]
The Ukrainian 🇺🇦 General Staff is reorganizing the defense of the Donbas by establishing two distinct zones of responsibility within the "East" Operational-Tactical Group (OTU).
The 3rd Army Corps – formed around the 3rd Assault Brigade (linked to Azov) – is currently… pic.twitter.com/kWlLfMrZ5U
■ Increased engagements; casualties remain above the 7-day average ■ Equipment losses close to average; highest 7-day losses of special equipment and APVs so far this year ■ Overnight attacks: 9 missiles intercepted; improved… pic.twitter.com/46PbK3NtXq
Operational Update as of 10:00 p.m. on August 27, 2026, regarding the Russian invasion
In total, 206 combat engagements have taken place since the start of this 24-hour period. The aggressor carried out 61 airstrikes using 188 guided bombs, deployed 6,538 kamikaze drones for attacks, and fired 2,385 rounds at the positions of our troops and populated areas.
In the Northern Slobozhanshchyna and Kursk sectors, the enemy has attacked twice since the start of the day, carrying out 40 shelling attacks on the positions of our troops and populated areas, two of which involved the use of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS).
In the Southern Slobozhansky direction, the enemy attacked the positions of our units 11 times toward the settlements of Kozacha Lopan, Hoptivka, Grafske, Rubizhne, Starytsia, Dovhenke, Radkivka, Okhrimivka, and Chugunivka. Three enemy assaults are ongoing.
In the Kupiansk sector, the enemy did not conduct any offensive operations.
Eight attempts by the invaders to advance were repelled in the Lyman sector near the settlements of Novyi Mir, Novoselivka, and in the vicinity of Lyman. Two of these attacks are ongoing.
In the Sloviansk direction, the Defense Forces halted three attempts by the invaders to advance in the areas around the settlements of Kryva Luka and Rai-Oleksandrivka.
In the Kramatorsk direction, Russian invaders did not carry out any assaults.
In the Kostiantynivka sector, the Defense Forces repelled 23 enemy assaults in the areas around the settlements of Kostiantynivka, Illinivka, Novoselivka, Rusyn Yar, Novopavlivka, Sofiivka, and Kucheri Yar. Three firefights are still ongoing.
The enemy carried out 36 attacks in the Pokrovsk direction. The occupiers attempted to advance toward the settlements of Bilytske, Dobropillia, Hannivka, Chernihivka, Svitle, Vasylivka, and Serhiivka, as well as in the areas of Molodetske, Novopidhorodne, Kotlyne, Udachne, and Novopavlivka. One attack is still ongoing.
According to preliminary estimates, 42 occupiers were eliminated and 24 were wounded here today; four vehicles, two specialized vehicles, and 38 enemy personnel shelters were destroyed. Four artillery pieces, one vehicle, three UAV control stations, and 68 enemy personnel shelters were damaged. A total of 236 unmanned aerial vehicles of various types were destroyed or neutralized.
In the Oleksandrivka sector, the enemy launched two attacks toward Myrne and Rybne.
In the Huliaipole sector, the Defense Forces repelled three enemy attacks toward the settlements of Vozdvizhivka and Chervona Krynytsia.
In the Orikhiv sector, our defenders thwarted two enemy attempts to advance in the area of Mala Tokmachka and Novodanilivka. Fighting continues.
In the Dnipro sector, the enemy attempted to improve its positions once.
In other sectors, there were no significant changes in the situation.
Let’s defeat the enemy and bring our Victory closer! Glory to Ukraine
A near-term Russian attack is highly unlikely to involve a full-scale conventional invasion of a NATO state. Ratcliffe delivered a warning to Russia not to attack NATO countries according to “sources briefed on the matter” cited by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on August 26.[1]
Ratcliffe warned Russian officials not to escalate conflict with the US’ NATO allies, particularly Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, according to two “sources familiar with the matter” cited by Politico on August 26.[2]
Ratcliffe’s arrival in Moscow on a C-17 military transport aircraft and his use of an American motorcade suggests that the US regarded the intelligence it had as reasonably urgent and sensitive and not merely warning of a distant threat.
Public reports of US intelligence community assessments note only that Russian action is possible “in the next few years,“ but the manner of Ratcliffe’s travel indicates concern about a shorter timeline.[3] A CIA director’s personal visit to deliver a message is unusual and is generally reserved for sensitive matters of the highest importance. Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) director Sergey Naryshkin confirmed on August 27 that he met Ratcliffe.[4] Russian insider source VChK-OGPU also claimed on August 26 that two departmental heads from the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), including the head of the service department responsible for operations in former Soviet states, were present at the meeting.[5]
The last trip by a CIA director to Moscow was in November 2021 when William Burns made a final effort to deter Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[6] The context of Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow in 2026 is very different, and comparisons between the two visits fail to capture key distinctions. Russian forces were already deep into a significant buildup of equipment, personnel, and other military assets on the border with Ukraine in late 2021 and early 2022 preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion.[7]
ISW has collected no specific indicators that Russia is preparing to conduct a large-scale invasion of the Baltic states, and ISW has observed no evidence of a similar large-scale buildup in the Russian border area with the Baltic states.
Estonian and Latvian officials noted that their assessment of Russian threats has not changed, suggesting that Baltic states have also not observed a buildup of Russian forces on their borders.[8]
Russia could, however, conduct strikes against targets in Baltic states or a limited land incursion with a small force. This sort of attack would not necessarily require a large, visible military buildup and so would not generate the type of indicators that analysts observed in 2021.
It remains unclear whether Russian President Vladimir Putin has directed or approved that Russian forces conduct any operations, but Ratcliffe’s visit is noteworthy and itself suggests that the US has indications that Russia is preparing for an act of aggression sooner than simply within “the next few years.”
A limited Russian attack against NATO’s eastern flank would aim to invalidate Article 5 by creating a situation in which the North Atlantic Council, which must vote unanimously to honor the Article 5 mutual defense clause of the NATO charter, is unable to agree about whether or how to respond to a Russian attack.
The Kremlin would likely choose an operation that it believes will maximize the possibility that NATO states would fail to unify on a decisive response and thus fail to send military assistance as an alliance to the member that had been attacked. NATO’s failure to agree to invoke Article 5 or to implement a unified and decisive response would significantly damage NATO’s credibility and severely erode the credibility of Article 5 in particular – one of Putin’s major longstanding strategic objectives beyond Ukraine.[20]
Several unidentified drones entered Moldovan airspace on the night of August 26 to 27, demonstrating that the Kremlin continues to accept the risk that Russia’s war against Ukraine can cause damage to other states, including Moldova and NATO states bordering Ukraine.
We'll get straight to the point: The financial hardships that Daily Kos is facing this year are tough.
We continue to be paywall-free. We continue to be supported by our readers, not billionaires or corporations. But we need to bring in more revenue. We are leaning on our community more than ever to help make ends meet.